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It is frequently asserted that the doctrine of  adverse possession performs a valuablesocial function in Ireland by allowing the ownership of  land forming part of  an
unadministered estate to be updated many years after the death of  the owner. More
specifically, it is argued that this role is particularly important in rural Ireland where,
historically, will-making was uncommon, emigration was widespread and grants of
representation were rarely extracted in relation to small farms.1 The typical scenario
involved the death of  the registered owner of  a farm2 with the result that his children
became entitled to the land as co-owners under the rules governing intestacies. However,
only one (or some) of  his children remained in possession of  the farm for 12 years or
more, while the others left to work and live elsewhere. In the meantime, the deceased
farmer’s estate remained unadministered. On the expiry of  the limitation period, a Land
Registry application could be made by the child in possession, frequently the eldest son,
pursuant to s 49 of  the Registration of  Title Act 1964 to register him as the new proprietor
on the basis of  his adverse possession.3 A s 49 application avoids the inconvenience and
expense of  extracting multiple grants if  there was more than one death on the title or the
need to obtain numerous consents to a deed of  family arrangement for the purposes of
releasing the intestate shares of  the applicant’s siblings. 
The role played by the doctrine in this context was acknowledged in the Oireachtas
debates which preceded the enactment of  s 126 of  the Succession Act 1965 which
reduced the limitation period for claims in respect of  the estate of  a deceased person
from 12 years to six years.4 This amendment was clearly intended to promote reliance on
the doctrine to resolve a problem perceived to be peculiar to rural Ireland at the time.
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More recently, in its third-party submission to Grand Chamber in Pye,5 the government
of  Ireland referred to the role played by the doctrine in facilitating the intergenerational
transfer of  farms in Ireland6 and argued that the doctrine represented a proportionate
means of  achieving this and other legitimate aims, justifying any potential interference
with the property rights of  owners.7 In sharp contrast, in England and Wales a co-owner
under an unadministered estate is absolutely precluded from relying on the doctrine and
it has been argued that it would be unfair to allow a strong-willed occupying member of
the family to obtain title by adverse possession as a result of  the generous attitude of
other members of  the family.8
Adverse possession between co-owners traditionally gave rise to theoretical
difficulties as one of  the basic tenets of  co-ownership is unity of  possession; therefore
possession by one co-owner was deemed to be possession by all of  them. Before the
enactment of  the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 it was only possible for a co-owner
who could prove that he had ousted the other co-owners to rely on the doctrine against
them. The First Report of  Commissioners on Real Property published in 1829 indicated that it
would be desirable to permit a finding of  adverse possession between co-owners without
proof  of  an ouster. Section 12 of  the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 gave effect to
this recommendation and provided that, if  a co-owner was in possession of  more than
his share of  the land for his own benefit, such possession would not be deemed to be the
possession of  the other co-owners.9 While this rule is re-enacted by s 21 of  the Irish
Statute of  Limitations 1957,10 the English law on this issue diverged with the enactment
of  the Law of  Property Act 1925 and the current position in England is that adverse
possession between co-owners is absolutely precluded.11
If  the co-ownership entitlements arise under an unadministered estate, the operation of
the doctrine becomes even more complicated as ownership vests for the meantime in the
deceased’s personal representatives or the Irish High Court/English Public Trustee.12
Occasionally, a personal representative, who is also entitled to a share in the estate, takes
possession of  the land for the limitation period. In this context, the implications of  two
other rules must be considered: the personal representative is deemed to hold the estate on
trust for those entitled to it under the will or intestacy rules13 and no limitation period
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of  the Family Division); s 14 of  the Law of  Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 substituted a new
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applies to actions to recover trust property in the possession of  a trustee.14 Under Irish law,
a personal representative is not deemed to be a ‘trustee’ for the purposes of  the running of
the limitation period15 and so he or she can rely on the doctrine to extinguish the claims of
the deceased owner’s successors. However, under English law the definition of  a ‘trustee’
includes a personal representative16 and therefore a personal representative may not rely on
the doctrine of  adverse possession against those with entitlements to the estate. 
Recently, concerns have been expressed in law reform circles in Ireland and elsewhere
in relation to the fairness of  the doctrine of  adverse possession, in particular the doctrine’s
limitations in protecting owners against the danger of  inadvertently losing title by adverse
possession and the extent to which the doctrine permits squatters who know that they do
not own the land (i.e. deliberate or ‘bad faith’ squatters) to acquire title. In England and
Wales, the qualified veto system of  adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration
Act 2002 which applies to land which has been registered in the Land Registry purported
to address both concerns. Additional protection is conferred on the registered owner who
may veto an adverse possession application, but the qualifications to the veto system
preserve the operation of  the doctrine for certain adverse possessors in the interests of
fairness (for example, a good faith adverse possessor of  boundary land).17 In 2005, the
Irish Law Reform Commission proposed certain reforms to the law on adverse possession
which imposed a mandatory requirement for a court application and restricted the
operation of  the doctrine to certain categories of  claimant. An attempt was made to
preserve the existing role played by the doctrine in the context of  unadministered estates
by conferring jurisdiction on the court to make an order vesting ownership in the applicant
where the adverse possession application ‘relates to land comprised in a deceased person’s
estate and it is reasonable to assume that an order in favour of  the applicant would accord
with the deceased’s wishes’.18 These Irish law reform proposals were ultimately jettisoned
in response to critical submissions made to the Irish government by the Law Society’s
Conveyancing Committee, mostly related to the workability and increased costs involved
in the administration of  the proposed scheme.19 However, the Irish Law Reform
Commission plans to revisit the matter of  reform in this area of  law in the future. In this
event, the introduction of  a qualified veto system of  adverse possession is likely to be
considered for Ireland. A discussion of  the substantive arguments in favour of  the
introduction of  such a reform has taken place elsewhere.20 The aim of  this article,
however, is to consider whether the doctrine of  adverse possession should continue to play
the same role in the context of  unadministered estates. If  the introduction of  a qualified
veto system of  adverse possession is proposed for Ireland, it will be necessary to consider
whether it should be tempered by a qualification to preserve its existing role in this
particular context. This article discusses whether such a qualification is necessary in the
interests of  fairness to address a prevailing social problem. It concludes that the particular
Adverse possession and unadministered estates 139
14   Statute of  Limitations 1957, s 44; Limitation Act 1980, s 21. 
15   Succession Act 1965, s 123.
16   S 38(1) of  the Limitation Act 1980 adopts the definition set out by s 68(1)(17) of  the Trustee Act 1925.
17   The Law Commission also claimed that these reforms were essential to ensure the compatibility of  the
doctrine of  adverse possession with title registration principles. For a critique of  this justification for the
reforms, see U Woods, ‘The English Law on Adverse Possession: A Tale of  Two Systems’ (2009) 38(1)
Common Law World Review 27, 31–38.
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problem of  deceased farmers’ estates remaining unadministered has become redundant
and it is critical of  the result achieved by the doctrine of  adverse possession in the context
of  unadministered estates. 
Parts 1 and 2 of  this paper trace the historical development of  this technically difficult
area of  law in England and in Ireland. While the current English position achieves a
sensible result, it appears to have happened inadvertently and not as a result of  any
considered policy decision. In contrast, the traditional policy justification for the Irish
position has been accepted on numerous occasions without any consideration of  the
fairness of  the result, particularly in a non-agricultural context. Part 3 of  this paper,
therefore, examines whether the Irish position is justified in modern times. The paper
concludes by discussing how the adoption of  a qualified veto system of  adverse possession
could confer added protection on those with co-ownership entitlements under
unadministered estates, but also preserve the doctrine to restore land to the market if  such
interests have been abandoned and facilitate certain informal transmissions on death. 
1 The development of the law in England
In England and Wales, before the Law of  Property Act 1925 came into force, many cases
were heard which involved one or more co-owners relying on s 12 of  the 1833 Act to
claim the benefit of  the doctrine of  adverse possession where they had possessed the
property to the exclusion of  the other co-owners.21 In more recent times, the Judicial
Committee of  the Privy Council has heard a number of  cases on appeal from
Commonwealth jurisdictions where the law on this issue has remained unchanged.22
The entry into force of  the Law of  Property Act 1925 on 1 January 1926 brought about
a fundamental change to the legal structure of  co-ownership in England and Wales. From
that date the legal title to co-owned property could only be held by joint tenants and a
statutory trust for sale was imposed in all cases of  co-ownership where such a trust was not
expressly created. This resulted in many co-owners holding the land on trust for sale for
themselves as equitable tenants in common, or joint tenants; it also brought about an
inadvertent change in the application of  the doctrine of  adverse possession, as was
highlighted in Re Landi.23 The circumstances of  that case involved one tenant in common
receiving the entire rent in relation to the co-owned premises for over 20 years from the end
of  1923 onwards. Sir Wilfred Greene MR pointed out that the 1925 Act converted both
tenants in common into trustees, although they were also beneficiaries. He held that s 12 of
the 1833 Act no longer applied as it contemplated a co-ownership relationship which did
not involve a trust. He noted: ‘The language is quite inapt to cover the case of  one of  two
trustees who are also their own beneficiaries.’ Sir Wilfred Greene MR concluded that a
trustee in possession or receiving rents and profits can never be regarded as doing so for
his own benefit and, therefore, the limitation period cannot run in his favour. 
The approach adopted in Re Landi gave rise to an inconsistency as a beneficial co-
owner who was not a trustee24 could bar the title of  the other beneficiaries through
adverse possession. This lacuna was closed by s 7(5) of  the Limitation Act 1939 which
made it clear that one beneficial co-owner cannot be in adverse possession against
another, regardless of  the location of  the legal estate. This provision was re-enacted by
para 9, Schedule 1 of  the Limitation Act 1980. Although co-owned land is now regarded
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as being held on a trust of  land rather than a trust for sale,25 para 9 provides that, where
such land is in the possession of  a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land (and
not being a person solely or absolutely entitled to the land), no right of  action to recover
the land shall be treated as accruing during that possession to any person in whom the
land is vested as trustee or to any other person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land. 
In Earnshaw v Hartley,26 the Court of  Appeal ruled that para 9 also applied in the
context of  an unadministered estate to prevent time running where one intestate
successor possesses the property to the exclusion of  others entitled to an intestate share.
In that case a son had remained on the farm after his mother died intestate in 1983. He
was later joined by his wife, the defendant, and in 1995 the son died. His mother had also
been survived by three daughters who obtained letters of  administration to their mother’s
estate in 1998 and sought various forms of  relief, including a declaration as to the
beneficial ownership and an order for sale. The defendant alleged that the daughters’
entitlements had been extinguished by her husband’s and her own successive adverse
possession of  the farm. Counsel for the defendant argued that para 9 did not apply before
the grant of  administration was extracted as the farm was vested in the President of  the
Family Division at that time and it was not held on a trust for sale. Nourse LJ refused to
apply this literal interpretation to para 9 and stated that, although technically the farm was
not held on trust for sale while it was vested in the President of  the Family Division,27 it
was presumptively so held; it would be artificial to distinguish between the position before
and after the grant of  administration. In the same vein, counsel for the defendant argued
that the siblings did not have a beneficial interest in the land or the proceeds of  sale, but
only a right to require the mother’s estate to be duly administered and to receive a quarter
share of  the net estate on completion of  the administration. Nourse LJ held that it would
be equally artificial to suggest that the siblings did not have an interest in the farm which
was sufficient for the purposes of  para 9.28
As has already been mentioned, a personal representative is deemed to be a ‘trustee’
for the purposes of  the Limitation Act 198029 and s 21 provides that no period of
limitation shall apply to an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property in the
possession of  a trustee. Therefore, a beneficial co-owner in possession who has extracted
a grant of  representation will be prevented from relying on the doctrine on two grounds:
first, because of  his or her position as a trustee and second, because of  his or her position
as a beneficial co-owner. 
Even if  the beneficial co-owner in possession has not extracted a grant, the decision
in James v Williams30 highlights that he could be deemed to be an executor de son tort on the
basis that he had intermeddled with the estate of  the deceased. Although an executor de son
tort does not come within the definition of  a personal representative,31 if  he is also
deemed to be a constructive trustee,32 which happened in James v Williams, s 21 will apply
to prevent time running in his favour. The circumstances in James v Williams were similar
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to those in Earnshaw v Hartley.33 On the intestate death of  the owner, his wife became
entitled to the beneficial interest in the family home, but she took no steps to administer
his estate. She died intestate in 1972 and the property was held on statutory trust for sale
for her three adult children: a son, William junior; a daughter, Thirza; and another
daughter, the plaintiff. The plaintiff  had moved out of  the property when she got married
and only visited from time to time. After the mother died, the plaintiff ’s siblings made it
clear to her that she was unwelcome at the family home and she became estranged from
them. From that point onwards, William Junior behaved as if  he owned the property. He
left the property to Thirza when he died in 1993 and when Thirza died in 1995 it was left
to her child, the defendant. The plaintiff  sought a declaration that she was entitled to a
one-third share in the property and an order for the sale of  the property. The defendant
contended that her claim was statute-barred. 
It is unclear why the plaintiff  failed to plead para 9 which prevents adverse possession
between beneficial co-owners.34 Instead, the parties focused on whether the son, as an
executor de son tort, was also a constructive trustee; if  he was, the parties accepted that the
limitation period could not begin to run in his favour. Counsel for the defendant seemed
to accept without question that his behaviour qualified as that of  an executor de son tort. The
court relied heavily on an article published in 197435 in which the author, Hinks,
maintained that anyone who takes possession of  the property of  a deceased person
without the permission of  the personal representatives or the court is an executor de son
tort.36 Hinks noted that an executor de son tort can rely on the doctrine of  adverse possession
unless he or she is also a constructive trustee.37 He pointed out that there would appear
to be no justification for imposing a constructive trust where the executor de son tort is a
complete stranger save in the most exceptional circumstances.38 This makes sense as
otherwise it would never be possible to acquire title by adverse possession against land
which formed part of  the estate of  a deceased owner.39 On the other hand, Hinks argued
that, where a brother seeks to establish title by adverse possession against his adult
siblings, there would appear to be every justification for imposing a constructive trust.40
The court concluded that the circumstances of  the case gave rise to such a constructive
trust. The brother knew he was not solely entitled to the property when he took
possession of  it and it would be inequitable to allow him to take advantage of  his decision
not to take out letters of  administration. Therefore, he was under an equitable duty to
hold it for himself  and his sisters on constructive trust. 
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36   Ibid 184.
37   Ibid 182.
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Jourdan and Radley-Gardner argue that the decision in James v Williams was per incuriam
in relation to two matters.41 First, it was made in ignorance of  para 9 and should simply
have been decided on the basis that the brother was a beneficial co-owner and so the
limitation period could not have run in his favour. Second, the attention of  the court was
not drawn to an earlier decision of  the Court of  Appeal in Pollard v Jackson42 which
decided that a squatter who took possession of  a flat, knowing of  the owner’s death, was
neither an executor de son tort nor a constructive trustee. There seems to be a divergence of
opinion on whether simply taking possession of  property is sufficient to make a person
an executor de son tort. Assuming that it is sufficient, the circumstances in Pollard can be
clearly distinguished from those in Earnshaw v Hartley as the squatter in Pollard was a
stranger and so would not have fallen within the category of  circumstances which Hinks
described as giving rise to a possible constructive trust. It should be mentioned, at this
point, that if  the Law Commission recommendations in its Report on the Limitation of
Actions43 are implemented, it will be possible for a trustee or a personal representative to
claim the benefit of  the limitation period against a beneficiary.44 This would stunt the
development of  James v Williams as an authority in this area and a beneficial co-owner out
of  possession would be restricted to relying on para 9. 
To summarise, in England and Wales, in all circumstances where co-ownership
entitlements arise under a will or on intestacy, it is impossible for either a personal
representative or someone with entitlements under an unadministered estate to benefit
from the doctrine. Only a stranger to the title can benefit. Although the changes to the
doctrine’s application between co-owners, initially brought about by the 1925 legislation,
may not have been the result of  a deliberate policy decision, the position appears to have
been accepted45 and even embraced by commentators.46
THE IMPACT OF RECENT REFORMS
The qualified veto, introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002 to govern adverse
possession of  registered land, may be exercised by the registered owner and other
specified persons.47 If  the registered owner is deceased, she will obviously not be in a
position to exercise a veto, although her personal representative may register as a person
entitled to be notified of  any adverse possession applications under rule 194.48 If  a
stranger to the title was in adverse possession before the death of  the registered owner,
it behoves a personal representative to act quickly to ensure that the veto is not lost. If
an adverse possession application is lodged after the death, but before the personal
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representative has had a chance to administer the estate or register under rule 194, it is
likely that no one will be in a position to exercise the veto. The legislative intention may
have been to restrict the added protection of  the veto to those who act quickly to update
the register following a disposition. However, it is submitted that the current rules have
the potential to operate quite harshly following a death on title where the registration gap
before the registration of  the transmission may be longer due to the delays inherent in
extracting a grant of  representation. It should be noted that the beneficiaries under the
unadministered estate are not in a position to protect themselves, as an application by
such beneficiaries to be notified of  adverse possession applications pursuant to rule 194
would probably be rejected by the registrar on the basis that such beneficiaries have no
interest in the land.49
This paper considers whether adverse possession is possible between beneficiaries
under an unadministered estate and the Land Registration Act 2002 does not change the
pre-existing law which prevented time running in these circumstances. As the law
currently stands in England and Wales, neither a trustee nor a beneficiary can benefit
from the doctrine of  adverse possession against another beneficiary. However, time may
run against a trustee if  the beneficiary is solely entitled.50 In its discussion of  the
exceptions to the veto system introduced by the 2002 Act, the Law Commission noted
that a person solely entitled by will or intestacy would qualify as a person entitled to be
registered as proprietor ‘for some other reason’.51 This exception would be relevant if  the
personal representative had registered himself  as the owner and would prevent such a
personal representative from vetoing an application by a person solely entitled who can
also prove adverse possession of  the land for at least 10 years. 
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Although a person entitled to a co-owner’s share in land pursuant to an unadministered
estate is precluded from relying on the doctrine of  adverse possession, if  she can prove
that the deceased owner represented to her that she would have some interest in the land
and she relied on that representation to her detriment, she may be entitled to a remedy
under the doctrine of  proprietary estoppel.52 The court may even order that the property
be transferred into her sole name. Recent restrictions imposed on this doctrine in the
context of  informal commercial transactions53 do not appear to have impacted on the
doctrine’s potential to provide a remedy in the context of  an informal testamentary
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disposition.54 Alternatively, a child of  the deceased owner may be in a position to apply for
provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, if  he or
she can prove that the will or intestacy rules failed to make reasonable provision for his or
her maintenance.55 Such a claim must be brought within six months of  the extraction of
the grant of  representation, although the court has discretion to extend this deadline.56
Where only one person with entitlements under an unadministered estate goes into
possession, the others may be content to disclaim their interests or be bought out.57 If
the land has increased in value since this person went into possession, that individual’s
bargaining power will have decreased. As one court succinctly put it, often only the ‘smell
of  oil’ in previously valueless land rekindles an interest in its ownership.58 If  such
negotiations fail, a personal representative or any of  the beneficial co-owners may apply
for an order for the sale of  the property and the division of  the proceeds between them.59
If  the other beneficial co-owners have abandoned the land and cannot be traced, it may
be possible to register the remaining co-owner as the sole owner pursuant to a Benjamin
Order or by taking out missing beneficiary insurance. Alternatively, the land may be sold
by the personal representative in the course of  administration,60 or by the trustees of  the
land if  it has already been vested in the co-owners by means of  an assent. In the context
of  a sale by the trustees of  the land, provided the statutory preconditions in relation to
overreaching are met,61 the purchaser will take the land free of  the interests of  any co-
owners which attach instead to the capital money. Although adverse possession is often
regarded as playing an essential role in restoring abandoned land to the market, the
doctrine is unnecessary in this particular context as its release onto the market is
facilitated by either the powers of  the personal representative or the overreaching
mechanism. The absent co-owners’ share of  the sale proceeds may be preserved for them
in a separate account or, if  missing beneficiary insurance or a Benjamin Order were
obtained, it may be distributed to the remaining co-owner. 
2 The development of the law in Ireland 
A number of  issues which had obfuscated the law in this area have recently been clarified
by Irish case law and legislation. First of  all, where only one or some of  the persons
entitled to an intestate share took or remained in possession after the death of  the owner,
doubts arose in relation to the impact of  their entitlements as next-of-kin on the
operation of  the doctrine of  adverse possession. A strong line of  early authority
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ordered the transfer of  a farm into the name of  the claimant who had worked on the deceased’s farm for 30
years without pay in reliance on oblique assurances made by the deceased that he would inherit it. See
B McFarlane and A Robertson ‘Apocalypse Averted; Proprietary Estoppel in the House of  Lords’ [2009] Law
Quarterly Review 535; M Dixon, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: A Return to Principle?’ [2009] Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer 260. 
55   See Re Pearce [1998] 2 FLR 705 where provision was made for a son who had worked for very low wages on
his father’s sheep farm. 
56   Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 4. See Re Salmon [1981] Ch 167 for judicial
guidelines on how this discretion is exercised. 
57   Solicitors advising such beneficiaries need to be mindful of  the taxation implications of  such arrangements. 
58   Quates v Griffin 239 So 2d 803 (Miss 1970).
59   Trusts of  Land and Appointment of  Trustees Act 1996, s 14.
60   Administration of  Estates Act 1925, s 39(1). 
61   S 27(2) of  the Law of  Property Act 1925, as amended by the Trusts of  Land and Appointment of  Trustees
Act 1996 requires the purchase money to be paid to at least two trustees or a trust corporation. 
developed62 which suggested that on the expiry of  the limitation period such possessors
took their own shares as tenants in common, but acquired the shares of  those out of
possession as joint tenants. The rationale was that before the estate is distributed, the
next-of  kin have specific equitable interests as tenants in common in the intestate’s estate.
Therefore, on the expiry of  the limitation period, they would have extinguished the legal
title in respect of  their own shares, but they would have extinguished the entire title of
those out of  possession and so would take those shares as joint tenants, as if  they were
strangers to the title. This approach obviously makes it very difficult to trace the title, as
the ruling in Christie v Christie63 demonstrates. In that case, a farmer had died intestate and
was succeeded by his wife and five children. His wife would have been entitled to a third
share in the farm64 and each child was entitled to a 2/15ths share as a tenant in common.
The wife and two of  his children remained in possession and, when the wife died, the
court noted that each child, including those in possession, would have become entitled to
a 1/5th of  her third, i.e. another 1/15th share in the entire farm. On the expiry of  the
limitation period the two children in possession held 3/15ths each as tenants in common
and became entitled to the remaining 9/15ths of  the farm as joint tenants. Section 125(1)
of  the Succession Act 1965 now clarifies that, where two or more persons are entitled to
shares in land forming part of  the estate of  a deceased person as co-owners and any of
them enters into possession, they shall be deemed as between themselves and those who
do not enter to have acquired title by possession as joint tenants and not tenants in
common, notwithstanding any rule of  law to the contrary. This provision treats those
entitled to a testate or an intestate share as strangers with no rights in the estate for the
purposes of  the running of  the limitation period. 
Section 125 did not apply retrospectively and therefore failed to clarify the legal
position in relation to the estate of  a person who died before 1 January 1967 (the date the
1965 Act came into force). When this issue was raised in Maher v Maher,65 O’Hanlon J
acknowledged that the weight of  Irish authority was in favour of  the view that the next-
of-kin remaining in possession should be regarded as tenants in common in relation to
their own shares. However, he found the authorities to the contrary more persuasive and
noted that the case law on this issue was not consistent. He ruled that where some of  the
next-of-kin of  a deceased owner remain in possession to the exclusion of  others, their
possession of  the entire property is adverse to the claims of  the other next-of-kin and the
personal representative and, on the expiry of  the limitation period, they acquire title as
joint tenants. He was not prepared to distinguish between the character of  their
occupation in relation to the shares claimed by them in their capacity as next-of-kin and
the shares of  the other next-of-kin which they were in the process of  extinguishing. In
the Supreme Court decision in Gleeson v Feehan,66 Keane J finally put this matter to rest by
endorsing the approach taken by O’Hanlon J in Maher and overruling any contrary
authorities. Keane J held that it was contrary to elementary legal principles to regard the
next-of-kin of  an intestate or those entitled to the residuary estate of  a deceased person
as being the owners in equity of  specific property. They are only entitled to a right, in the
nature of  a chose in action, to the payment to them of  the balance of  the estate after the
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62   See Ward v Ward (1871) LR 6 Ch App 789; Smith v Savage [1906] 1 IR 469; Christie v Christie [1917] 1 IR 17. For
a discussion of  this line of  authority, see Pearce (n 1); B Spierin and P Fallon, The Succession Act 1965 and Related
Legislation: A Commentary 3rd edn (Butterworths 2003) paras 799–801. 
63   [1917] 1 IR 17.
64   The land was leasehold which meant that it fell to be distributed according to the rules set out in the Statute
of  Distributions (Ireland) 1695. 
65   [1987] ILRM 542. 
66   [1993] 2 IR 113.
debts have been discharged, a right which can be enforced against the personal
representative. It was unnecessary and inappropriate to analyse the ownership of  the
deceased’s estate in terms of  who was entitled to the legal estate and who was entitled to
the equitable estate. He was satisfied that the possession of  one of  the next-of-kin and
another person following the death of  the owner was adverse to the title of  the President
of  the High Court, in whom the entire estate was vested pending the raising of
representation.67 On the expiry of  the limitation period they acquired title as joint tenants
and on the death of  one of  them, the surviving joint tenant became the sole owner. 
Section 125(2) clarifies that sub-s (1) applies even if  one of  the persons entitled to a
share in the deceased’s land entered into possession as a personal representative or
subsequently took out a grant of  representation to the estate of  the deceased.68 As has
already been mentioned, s 123 provides that a personal representative shall not be a
trustee for the purposes of  the Statute of  Limitations 1957.69 Therefore, s 44 of  the 1957
Act, which imposes no time limit on actions to recover trust property in the possession
of  a trustee, does not apply to actions against a personal representative in possession.
Also, the definition of  a trustee for the purposes of  the Statute of  Limitations does not
include a constructive trustee70 and so, in sharp contrast to the English position,71 if  the
court deems the person who took possession to be an executor de son tort72 and a
constructive trustee for those entitled to the estate, this will not prevent the limitation
period from running in that person’s favour. 
Finally, s 126 of  the Succession Act has given rise to confusion and controversy in this
area. It replaced s 45 of  the 1957 Act which imposed a 12-year limitation period on
actions in relation to any entitlements in the estate of  a deceased person. The new
limitation period is six years unless the right of  action was fraudulently concealed, in
which case s 71 of  the 1957 Act applies. This amendment was clearly designed to speed
up the clarification of  title to land which forms part of  an unadministered estate.
However, a lacuna in the application of  the new limitation period was highlighted by the
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67   This approach contrasts sharply with the approach taken in Earnshaw (n 26). 
68   See Spierin and Fallon (n 62) para 804, who point out that, once the estate has been administered and title has
been vested in those entitled as tenants in common, s 125 will no longer apply and, where only some take
possession for the limitation period, the old difficulties will arise. Those in possession will retain their own
shares as tenants in common but the shares of  the absent co-owners as joint tenants. 
69   Conflicting early authorities had led to confusion over whether a personal representative was an express
trustee, as such a trustee was barred from relying on the doctrine pursuant to s 25 of  the Real Property
Limitation Act 1833: see Re Loughlin [1942] IR 15 and Vaughan v Cottingham [1961 IR 184. Section 2(2)(d) of
the Statute of  Limitations 1957 clarified the position and this provision was substituted by s 123 of  the
Succession Act 1965. 
70   Statute of  Limitations 1957, s 2(2)(a)(i).
71   See James v Williams [2000] Ch 1.
72   The Law Reform Commission has suggested that if  a person who takes possession of  the deceased’s land is
deemed to be an executor de son tort he or she will not be able to avail of  the running of  the limitation period
unless he or she fulfils all the duties of  the office: see Law Commission, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing
Law (7): Positive Covenants over Freehold Land and Other Proposals (LRC 70 2003) para 6.33. It would be quite
strange if  someone who took out a grant of  representation could rely on the doctrine, while a person who
did not take out a grant could not. It should be noted that the ruling of  Gibson J in Doyle v Foley [1903] 2 IR
95, 100, contradicts the view expressed by the Law Reform Commission on this issue. He stated that unless
it was possible to infer an express trust, agency or estoppel from the facts of  the case, an executor de son tort is
not in a fiduciary relation to a deceased person’s estate. He pointed out that in all the authorities cited it was
assumed by the court that, in the absence of  special circumstances, such an executor could rely on the
limitation period. As has already been mentioned, in England, where a personal representative is precluded
from relying on the doctrine, it is accepted that an executor de son tort (provided he or she is not a constructive
trustee) may benefit from the doctrine.
High Court decision in Drohan v Drohan73 and the subsequent Supreme Court decision in
Gleeson v Feehan.74 The court, in both instances, ruled that s 126 only applies to actions
brought by those entitled to a share in the estate and not to actions brought by the
personal representative. Therefore, following an intestate death, if  a grant has not yet
been extracted and one of  the next-of-kin has been in possession, another can extract a
grant and rely on the 12-year limitation period to bring an action. It remains unclear
whether the next-of-kin are then entitled to insist that the personal representative vests
their shares in them, given their limitation period has expired.75
In the aftermath of  the Gleeson case, practitioners called for reform in this area and the
Law Reform Commission in a report published in 200376 recommended that a uniform
limitation period of  12 years should be applied to claims by beneficiaries and by personal
representatives. The Law Reform Commission acknowledged that a return to a 12-year
limitation period in all cases arguably abandons the policy behind s 126, which was to
quieten titles as soon as possible after the owner’s death and thereby benefit those who
remain on to run the family farm or business. However, the recommended approach
would lead to greater simplicity and consistency within the general law of  adverse
possession and remove the anomalies which have arisen since the passing of  s 126.77
Section 126 provides that the limitation period commences on the date that the right to
receive the share or interest accrued and, as this has also been a source of  confusion and
debate,78 the Law Reform Commission recommended legislative clarification that the
right of  action should be deemed to accrue on the date of  death.79
These recommendations have yet to be implemented. Although Keating endorses the
recommendation for statutory clarification that time begins to run on the date of  death,
he criticises the primary recommendation for an increase in the limitation period.80 He
argues that personal representatives should be brought within the scope of  the original
amendment. In his opinion, a limitation period of  six years is in keeping with the general
policy against delay in the administration of  estates. In Keating’s experience, beneficiaries
are not coy when it comes to claiming shares or interests in estates and he notes that any
tardiness may be remedied by the citation process. Although he was of  the opinion that
beneficiaries are rarely undone by sloth, the experience of  Land Registry officials seems
to suggest otherwise. Over 1000 adverse possession applications are made in relation to
registered land on an annual basis81 and an internal survey conducted by the Property
Registration Authority in 2008 revealed that over 56 per cent of  these involved adverse
possession between family members, typically in relation to property forming part of  an
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73   [1984] IR 311.
74   [1993] 2 IR 113.
75   See Spierin and Fallon (n 62) para 811; P R Coughlan ‘Limitation of  Actions: the Recovery of  Land by
Personal Representatives’ (1991) 13 Dublin University Law Journal 164, 167–68; M Hourigan ‘The Running
of  Time in Succession Law: Gleeson v Feehan and Purcell’ (2000) 5(2) Conveyancing and Property Law
Journal 34, 36.
76   Law Reform Commission (n 72) ch 6. 
77   Ibid para 6.44.
78   Does the right to receive the share or interest arise on the date of  death, when the grant of  representation is
extracted or once the personal representative takes possession? See Law Reform Commission (n 72) paras
6.14–22. 
79   Ibid para 6.27.
80   A Keating, The Law and Practice of  Personal Representatives (Round Hall 2004) para 9.19.
81   This level of  applications appears to be quite consistent: 1378 s 49 applications were received in 2007 and
1081 applications were received in 2011. 
unadministered estate.82 This survey also revealed that objections are usually received to
such applications and the most frequent objector is someone who claims to be entitled to
a share on intestacy or under the will of  the deceased registered owner. Of  course, once
the limitation period has expired, such an objection has no legal basis and will not prevent
registration in the absence of  another valid ground for objection, for example, proof  that
the objector continued to engage in acts of  possession, that the applicant was not in
possession, or was in possession pursuant to an express or an implied licence. 
Where only one or some of  the next-of-kin enter into or remain in possession
following the death of  the deceased owner, those out of  possession are clearly in a very
precarious position as the law currently stands. Any licence agreement which renders the
possession consensual and non-adverse should be recorded in writing to avoid future
misunderstandings and solicitors consulted by such next-of-kin need to bear in mind the
different limitation periods in order to avoid the possibility of  a negligence claim.83
3 A critique of the Irish approach
It is submitted that the role played by the doctrine in updating the ownership of  farms
following a death on title is no longer significant.84 The traditionally casual approach to
the administration of  estates comprising agricultural land has disappeared during recent
decades, probably due to the advent of  EU grants. On the death of  a farmer, his or her
family will wish to ensure that any outstanding entitlements under the single-farm
payment scheme are paid into the estate and they will be conscious of  the need to transfer
the ongoing entitlements. These entitlements pass separate to the land and, in the absence
of  a specific bequest, they pass to the residuary legatee. The Department of  Agriculture
requires the submission of  a grant of  probate or a grant of  administration intestate and
a valid herd number to secure the transfer of  inherited entitlements. Frequently, waivers
are also submitted to allow the entitlements to be transferred to the person who is
inheriting the farm.85 Once the grant has been extracted, it is a fairly simple matter to
update the land register which explains why the doctrine is no longer relied on to update
farm ownership following a death on title.86
The Northern Ireland Law Commission has recently argued that the doctrine of
adverse possession continues to perform a useful function in relation to succession to
registered farmland87 and refers to two recent cases to demonstrate this point: Renaghan v
Breen88 and Meyler v Ferris.89 The commission also maintains that the advent of  EU grants,
payments or regulations has not changed matters, as generally these schemes do not
require the applicant to be the owner of  the land. For example, the Nitrates Action
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82   This survey is set out in Appendix 2 and discussed in chapter 3, part 2, of  the PhD thesis mentioned above
(n 20). The survey illustrates the most common functions performed by the doctrine: namely, the resolution
of  title defects, updating ownership of  property forming part of  unadministered estates; tidying up informal
transactions; restoring abandoned land to the market and resolving boundary disputes. 
83   See Hourigan (n 75) 36. 
84   This has been informally confirmed by Irish Land Registry officials.
85   I am grateful to the Inheritance Enquiry Unit of  the Department of  Agriculture for discussing these
requirements with me. 
86   While there is no guarantee that the person inheriting the farm will update the register following the issue of
the grant, it is likely that obtaining the grant would be viewed as the most onerous part of  this process.
87   See Northern Ireland Law Commission, Supplementary Consultation Paper Land Law (NILC 3 2010) para 2.29.
88   [2000] NIJB 174.
89   [2009] NICA 16.
Programme Regulations (NI) 2006 (No 489) apply to the ‘controller’ of  the land.90 As
was mentioned above, however, on the death of  the original applicant, the administrators
of  such schemes will generally require proof  of  a transfer of  entitlements and, at least in
the case of  the single-farm payment, the submission of  a grant of  probate/
administration intestate. While it may be that the doctrine continues to play a role in this
respect in Northern Ireland, in the Republic of  Ireland, the evidence indicates that this is
no longer the case. It should also be noted that neither of  the cases cited by the Northern
Ireland Law Commission involved a family member who had gone into possession of  a
farm many years ago and was now attempting to update the ownership of  land forming
part of  an unadministered estate. In Renaghan v Breen, the disputed land comprised a house
and yard which had been the subject matter of  an informal transfer to the plaintiff ’s
great-grandfather dating back to the 1880s. It had subsequently passed down through the
family line to the plaintiff. The court was satisfied that adverse possession had been
established against the registered owner by the cumulative adverse possession of  the
plaintiff ’s predecessors or in the alternative by the plaintiff ’s 12 years’ adverse possession
since 1975. Although the disputed land in Meyler v Ferris was a farm, the paper title was
completely up-to-date until the death of  the owner, Bridie Ferris, in 2005. She had left the
land to her niece, but her nephew claimed in these proceedings to have acquired title to
the farm by adverse possession. The court was satisfied, however, that any acts of  adverse
possession by the defendant had only begun in 2001 and, therefore, the limitation period
had not expired.91 It submitted, therefore, that these authorities do not demonstrate that
the doctrine continues to play an important role in updating the ownership of  farms
forming part of  an unadministered estate. 
If  this peculiarly agricultural justification for the doctrine has become obsolete, it is
necessary to consider whether adverse possession should continue to play the same role
in the context of  unadministered estates. Is it fair to allow the occupying sibling to
extinguish the rights of  those out of  possession? Although it is difficult to make
generalisations in this area, it could be argued that the moral entitlement of  an applicant
who has entered or remained in possession of  the family home or a residential investment
property following the death of  a parent is not as strong as that of  a child who had been
raised to take over a farm and perhaps forgone an education and adequate pay during the
lifetime of  the parent. It is also easy to imagine a situation where absent members of  the
family were content to allow a sibling to continue to occupy a property, but failed to
appreciate that their interests were in danger of  being extinguished by neglecting to
formalise the arrangement. The fact that family members frequently object to s 49
applications reflects the counter-intuitive nature of  the law on this issue. The potential for
misunderstanding renders absent members extremely vulnerable, an argument which has
been made to justify the English position which precludes adverse possession in such
circumstances.92
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90   It could be argued that the most straightforward way for a farmer to demonstrate control of  the land
(assuming he or she is not in occupation under a lease or a licence) is to submit proof  that he or she is the
current registered owner, although admittedly those administering such schemes may not insist on this: see
Meyler v Ferris ibid (the defendant had applied for and received certain subsidies in relation to the land for a
few years until the niece who had inherited the land objected that he did not have permission to claim them).
91   The facts of  this case bear some resemblance to those of  Gunning v Sherry [2012] IEHC 88. In Gunning, the
owner of  a cottage had made a will leaving it to his wife and two daughters. After he died, one of  the
daughters attempted to rely on the doctrine of  adverse possession against her mother and sister, but the court
held that she had failed to demonstrate anything approaching the requisite limitation period. 
92   See Miller (n 8). 
At the beginning of  this paper, the Law Reform Commission’s proposals for the
reform of  the Irish law on adverse possession were mentioned. These reforms required
an applicant seeking to establish title by adverse possession to make a court application
and purported to limit the doctrine’s operation so that it would no longer operate
unfairly.93 Although these recommendations appear to have been abandoned, they are still
of  interest as the Law Reform Commission envisaged a continuing role for the doctrine
in the context of  unadministered estates. The court would be permitted to grant a vesting
order if  the adverse possession application related to land comprised in a deceased
person’s estate and it was reasonable to assume that an order in favour of  the applicant
would accord with the deceased’s wishes.94 This reform seems to be designed to preserve
the role played by the doctrine in effecting the transfer of  a farm forming part of  an
unadministered estate to a child who remained in possession following the intestate death
of  a farmer. However, the introduction of  an approach which appears to require the
court to guess at the subjective views of  the deceased owner seems unwise, especially
when the doctrine of  proprietary estoppel provides a much more stable basis for the
grant of  a remedy in such circumstances95 and also allows the court more flexibility in its
response.96 If  the child can prove an intention to create legal relations, consideration and
part performance, it may also be possible to prove that the deceased entered into a
contract to leave a particular property to him or her by will. In McCarron v McCarron,97 the
Supreme Court was satisfied that the farmer had entered into a contract to devise the
farm to the plaintiff  (his first cousin once removed) in consideration of  the free labour
that the plaintiff  had provided on the farm and would continue to provide during the
farmer’s lifetime.98 The court ordered specific performance of  that contract,99 but
Murphy J noted that the plaintiff  may also have been entitled to a remedy pursuant to the
doctrine of  proprietary estoppel. It is important to note, however, that recent case law100
has treated such causes of  action as subsisting against the deceased on his or her date of
death and therefore subject to s 9(2)(b) of  the Civil Liability Act 1961 which imposes a
Adverse possession and unadministered estates 151
93   Law Reform Commission (n 1) 327–32.
94   The court would also have the option of  ordering the payment of  compensation. The requirement for a court
application and the possibility of  compensation were criticised by the Law Society of  Ireland as they would
increase costs and clog up the courts unnecessarily given that the Land Registry procedure has been operating
successfully to date.
95   See Smyth v Halpin [1997] 2 ILRM 38 where in response to his father’s assurance that the family home would
be his after his mother’s death and, at his father’s suggestion, the son built an extension to the home at his
own expense. When his father left the home to one of  his daughters instead, the court ordered a conveyance
of  the house to the son pursuant to the doctrine of  proprietary estoppel. 
96   In some circumstances, conferring a right of  residence or awarding compensation may be more appropriate
than an outright transfer of  ownership. See H Delany, Equity and the Law of  Trusts in Ireland 4th edn (Round
Hall 2007) 728–38.
97   [1997] 2 ILRM 349.
98   The court commented that in some parts of  Ireland, particularly rural areas, a meeting of  minds can be
achieved without as detailed a discussion as might be necessary elsewhere and noted how the evidence of  the
plaintiff  evinced a natural courtesy (which John Millington Synge associated with the west of  Ireland) which
often results in an unwillingness to pursue discussion to a logical and perhaps harshly expressed commercial
conclusion. 
99   Such a remedy will not usually be available in England and Wales as contracts for the sale of  land entered into
after 26 September 1989 are void unless they are in writing; see s 2(1) of  the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989. 
100  In the Matter of  the Estate of  F Deceased, S 1 v PR 1 and PR 2 [2013] IEHC 407; Prendergast v McLaughlin [2009]
IEHC 250; Corrigan v Martin (HC, 13 March 2006). See also, A Keating, ‘The Application of  s 9(2)(b) of  the
Civil Liability Act 1961 to Equitable Causes of  Action Against Estates of  Deceased Persons’ (2010) 15(2)
Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 37.
limitation period of  two years from the date of  death101 to bring proceedings against the
deceased’s estate. 
It should be noted that a child also has the option of  bringing an application pursuant
to s 117 of  the Succession Act 1965,102 although such an application must be brought
within six months of  the extraction of  the grant103 and is unavailable if  the parent dies
intestate.104 If  the court is of  the opinion that the testator has failed in his or her moral
duty to make proper provision for the child in accordance with his or her means, whether
by will or otherwise, it may order that just provision be made for the child out of  the
estate.105 In assessing the extent of  that moral duty, the court will have regard to special
circumstances, such as where ‘a child is induced to believe that by . . . working on a farm,
he may ultimately become the owner of  it, thereby causing him to shape his upbringing,
training and life accordingly’.106
McDonald v Norris107 concerned a s 117 application by a son who had left school early
to look after the farm after his father had an accident and had worked for minimal
recompense for over 20 years. The relationship between father and son had been very bad
since the son’s marriage and, at one point, the son was imprisoned for refusing to comply
with an order for possession of  the lands which his father had obtained against him.
While the son was in prison, the father sold some of  the land and transferred another
portion to the applicant’s younger brother. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
applicant’s bad behaviour towards his father, but felt that it should be considered in the
context of  his father’s reaction to his marriage. His bad behaviour diminished the extent
of  the father’s moral obligation, but did not extinguish it. The court ordered the transfer
of  the remaining lands to the son, on condition that he paid a sum of  money to his cousin
(the father’s intended beneficiary). A v C and D108 concerned an application by a son who
had received a third share in the proceeds of  sale of  one parcel of  land, €40,000, a site
and some machinery. The deceased’s grand plan was to leave a farm to each of  his three
sons, but difficult economic conditions intervened and when he died he only owned two
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101  Or the period of  limitation prescribed by the Statute of  Limitations 1957 or any other limitation enactment,
whichever expires earlier. No special shortened limitation period is imposed in relation to subsisting claims
against an estate in England; see the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. 
102  The Law Reform Commission has recently sought views on whether s 117 of  the Succession Act 1965 should
be repealed, retained as it is, or amended; see Law Reform Commission, Issues Paper on Section 117 of  the
Succession Act 1965 (LRC IP 9 2016) para 1.5.
103  S 117(6) of  the Succession Act 1965 originally set a time limit of  12 months, but it was reduced to six months
by s 46 of  the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. This time limit is strictly applied (see MPD v MD [1981] ILRM
179) and the personal representatives are under no obligation to inform the testator’s children of  their right
to bring a s 117 application (see Rojack v Taylor and Buchalter [2005] IEHC 28). It was recently clarified that the
six-month limitation period does not run from the issue of  an ad litem grant: see In the Matter of  the Estate of
F deceased (n 100). The Law Reform Commission has recently sought views on whether s 117(6) should be
amended to extend this time limit and to clarify that the limitation period begins to run from the date of  death
or some other date; see Law Reform Commission (n 102) paras 3.5 and 4.3.
104  The deceased must die wholly or partly testate: see the 1965 Act, s 109. In RG v PSG (HC, 20 November
1981), Carroll J held that the deceased had died testate for the purposes of  s 109 even though the will was
wholly inoperative at the date of  his death. The Law Reform Commission has recently sought views on
whether s 117 should be extended to claims by children of  parents who die intestate; see Law Reform
Commission (n 102) para 2.3. 
105  See J C Brady, Succession Law in Ireland 2nd edn (Butterworths 1995) paras 7.48–79; Speirin and Fallon, (n 62)
paras 695–745; F de Londras, Principles of  Irish Property Law 2nd edn (Clarus Press  2011) paras 16.69–96.
106  See Re ABC deceased; XC and Others v RT and Another (HC, 2 April 2003). See MH and NMcG v NM and CM
[1983] ILRM 519. 
107  [2000] 1 ILRM 382.
108  [2007] IEHC 120.
farms. The applicant had been dependent on the deceased for many years to provide him
with a farming livelihood and a residence for his family which he would now lose. The
court was satisfied that the deceased had failed in his moral duty. An order for the transfer
of  either of  the farms to the applicant would leave the deceased’s remaining children
inadequately provided for and, instead, the court ordered that the sum of  €750,000 be
substituted for the applicant’s testamentary legacy of  €40,000.109
Hourican notes that, if  a s 117 application or proprietary estoppel claim seems
unlikely to succeed, the child may bring a claim, in the alternative, for payment on a
quantum meruit basis for works done or services rendered by the plaintiff  for and at the
request of  the deceased.110 It is clear, therefore, that a child who feels hard done by as
a result of  the intestacy rules or the provision made by a parent’s will may have access
to a number of  remedies which allow the court the flexibility to specifically address the
injustice and limit the impact of  any order on the other beneficiaries. To avail of  any of
these remedies, the child must be cognisant of  the relevant limitation periods as such
actions become statute-barred within a short period of  time. The reason for these
special shortened limitation periods following a death is clear. As Fennelly J stated in
Corrigan v Martin: 
One relevant consideration is that those charged as executors or administrators
of  estates of  deceased persons are entitled and, indeed, bound to carry out their
tasks with reasonable expedition and that creditors of  the estate and, ultimately,
the beneficiaries are entitled to have the estate administered within a reasonable
time. I believe the Oireachtas deliberately chose to impose a short but fair time
limit on claims so that these desirable objectives would be achieved.111
Conclusion 
Adverse possession is a crude mechanism to rely on to resolve the disputes which can
arise between beneficiaries with an entitlement to land following a death on title. It results
in the automatic transfer of  ownership to the possessor without any consideration of  the
circumstances of  the other beneficiaries or their vulnerability to a claim when a family
member goes into possession. It is submitted that these beneficiaries are in need of
additional protection and this paper demonstrates that adequate alternative remedies exist
to protect a beneficiary with a moral claim. 
It would not be appropriate to emulate the English law which absolutely precludes
adverse possession between co-owners, as there is no appetite in Ireland to impose a trust
of  land on co-owners.112 Neither would such reform be necessary to achieve the desired
result. It is submitted that the doctrine of  adverse possession should continue to operate
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109  The court rejected the applicant’s claim that he had acquired title to the residence and surrounding lands by
adverse possession as the court was satisfied that he had been present by the licence of  the deceased. The
court also rejected his claim for a remedy pursuant to the doctrine of  proprietary estoppel on the basis of  the
improvements which he had carried out to the residence, as the court could find no evidence of  an assurance
by the deceased that the residence would be his.
110  M Hourican, ‘Section 117 Claims: Practice and Procedure and Matters to Bear in Mind’ (2001) 6(3)
Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 62. Note that, in Coleman v Mullen [2011] IEHC 179, the court
emphasised that, if  the services were rendered on a voluntary basis and without an intention to create legal
relations, a quantum meruit claim must fail. 
111  Corrigan v Martin (HC March 13 2006) p 6 of  transcript, endorsing the views expressed by O’Higgins CJ in
Moynihan v Greensmyth [1977] IR 55.
112  See Law Reform Commission (n 72) para 5.05; Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Reform and
Modernisation of  Land Law and Conveyancing Law (LRC CP 34 2004) para 6.03; Law Reform Commission (n 102)
para 3.5.
between co-owners, but, at the end of  the limitation period, a veto should be conferred
on the co-owners out of  possession. This would enable land to be brought back on to the
market in the event that certain co-owners had abandoned their interests, but would also
confer added protection on vulnerable co-owners who had assumed that their interests
were not in danger of  being extinguished. The impact would be similar to a return to the
law on non-adverse possession, which required proof  of  an ouster between co-owners,113
although the veto approach would be much more straightforward to apply. 
As has been argued elsewhere, registration principles should not limit the protective
scope of  any qualified veto system of  adverse possession introduced in Ireland.114
Therefore, following a death on title, the veto could easily be extended to any personal
representative appointed and any beneficiaries entitled under the will or the rules on
intestacy.115 Where land was being adversely possessed by a stranger to the title before the
death of  the owner, this approach, in contrast to the English one, would confer added
protection on his or her successors during the period following the death of  the owner
while the estate remains unadministered and the register is out-of-date. If  one successor
makes an adverse possession application against other successors with entitlements under
an unadministered estate, those out of  possession would be able to veto the application.
If  they fail to exercise their veto, because they have no objection to the registration of  the
applicant as owner or they have abandoned their interests, the application would proceed.
Also, the personal representative’s veto would not be effective against an adverse
possessor solely entitled under the deceased owner’s will or the rules governing
intestacies. Therefore, the doctrine would continue to play a very limited role where the
unadministered estate involved abandoned interests or an informal transmission. 
If  the veto is exercised, the dispute will have to be resolved between the successors.
The adverse possessor may have to negotiate releases from the objectors if  he or she
wishes to be registered as the sole owner and, if  these releases are not forthcoming, and
the beneficiaries are not prepared to be registered as co-owners, the property would have
to be sold in the course of  administration and the proceeds distributed amongst them.116
It is important to bear in mind that a claim based on the doctrine of  proprietary estoppel
or s 117 of  the 1965 Act would also be available in the immediate aftermath of  the
deceased’s death. However, restricting the operation of  the doctrine of  adverse
possession in this particular context would render it necessary to ensure that the
alternative remedies available are adequate. Therefore, it is submitted that, in line with
previous recommendations which have been made in this regard, s 117 of  the Succession
Act should be extended to intestate deaths and the court should be given a discretion to
extend the deadline for bringing such an application.117
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113  See above (n 9).
114  See Woods (n 20), chs 2 and 9, for further discussion. 
115  Where such information is not available, notice could be served by posting site notices or advertising in
newspapers. 
116  Pursuant to s 50 of  the Succession Act 1965.
117  See the Law Reform Commission, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law (LRC 30 1989) 21–24; Law Reform
Commission (n 102) paras 2.3 and 3.5. See also, E Storan, ‘Section 117: Another Means for the Courts to
Rewrite a Will?’ (2006) 11(4) Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 82a. Similarly, it may be necessary to
revisit the shortened limitation period imposed by s 9(2)(b) of  the Civil Liability Act 1961 in relation to
subsisting claims against an estate. 
